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Takings Liability and Coastal Management in Rhode Island 
Manta Dircks, Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow  
December 2016 
The “takings” clauses of the federal and state constitutions provide an important basis for 
municipal liability in Rhode Island. The takings clauses require “just compensation” to any 
person whose property is “taken” for public use.1 The Rhode Island constitution limits state 
takings liability related to the state’s power to “regulate and control the use of land and 
waters,”2 but the more restrictive language of the state constitution cannot “defeat the 
mandates of the Federal Constitution.”3 As a result, takings cases in Rhode Island related to 
coastal management will generally allege violations of the federal Constitution.  
Takings can occur through direct condemnation through eminent domain or by “inverse 
condemnation” or “regulatory takings” in which government regulations or actions result 
in physical occupation of property or unconstitutional limits on the use of property.4 Where 
a taking occurs by inverse condemnation, the responsible government must compensate 
the property owner.5 This fact sheet reviews the standards under which courts decide 
regulatory takings cases arising in Rhode Island.  
Regulatory takings 
State, and local governments are empowered to issue regulations that promote the public 
health, safety, and welfare. Many of these regulations inevitably limit land use in some way, 
but are not takings provided they “are reasonably necessary to protect the public health 
and safety” and do not become “arbitrary, destructive, or confiscatory.”6 However, when 
these regulations place sufficient limits on land use to rise to the level of a regulatory 
taking,7 property owners may file “inverse condemnation” claims against the government 
to recover compensation for their losses.8 Regulatory takings may result from actions 
depriving a property owner of property value or compelling a property owner to suffer a 
physical invasion of her property.9  
Deprivation of use 
Under both federal and state law, a regulation that deprives a property owner of all 
economic or productive use of their property is a taking requiring payment of just 
compensation. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme Court held such 
“total” takings compensable in part due to a  concern that “regulations that leave the owner 
of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use—typically, as here, 
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by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state—carry with them a heightened 
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise 
of mitigating serious public harm.”10 This holding was in accord with prior Rhode Island 
precedent indicating that deprivation of all beneficial use of property is a taking that 
requires compensation.11  
Diminution of the value of property that does not rise to a per se taking may also require 
compensation. Diminution in property value alone is not sufficient to prevail on a claim for 
a regulatory taking.12 Instead, courts determine whether a taking has occurred in such 
cases under the federal and Rhode Island constitutions by applying a three-factor balancing 
test laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York.13 Courts applying the test focus on three factors, which include: (1) the character of 
the government regulation; (2) the reasonable expectation of the property owner; and (3) 
the economic impact of the regulation.14  
Plaintiffs in Rhode Island and elsewhere have asserted a variety of takings claims related to 
zoning and land use decisions restricting development. While zoning and land use 
restrictions do not constitute takings in many cases,15 they may be sufficiently burdensome 
in some cases so as to rise to the level of a taking.16 A number of cases related to denial of 
permission to develop coastal and wetlands areas have been reviewed by Rhode Island 
courts, however, and these have rarely risen to the level of a taking.17 
Physical occupation of property 
Physical occupation of property as a result of regulation may also result in a taking 
requiring compensation. Takings cases “establish that even a minimal ‘permanent physical 
occupation of real property’ requires compensation under the [Takings] Clause.”18 
Temporary occupation of property, like permanent occupation, may constitute a taking, 
including “when government action occurring outside the property [gives] rise to ‘a direct 
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.’”19  
Repeated or temporary flooding is considered a physical occupation and therefore may 
constitute a taking when induced or affected by the government.20 The Supreme Court 
identified factors for courts to consider in determining whether a temporary occupation is 
a taking, including: the duration of the occupation; the “character of the land at issue” and 
the owners’ “reasonable-investment backed expectations” regarding its use; whether the 
harm was a foreseeable or intended result of the government action; and the severity of the 
interference with use of the land.21 In 2015, the Court of Federal Claims applied these 
factors in St. Bernard Parish Government v. U.S. to determine that failure by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to properly construct, operate, and maintain the Mississippi River-Gulf 
Outlet caused a taking by substantially contributing to the flooding of parts of New Orleans 
during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent storms.22  
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Rhode Island regulatory takings liability related to coastal management 
Coastal management decisions may give rise to takings claims under a variety of 
circumstances, notably including limitations on or requirements for development of coastal 
properties and causing or substantially contributing to inundation during storm events or 
high tide events. These types of claims may become more common in the future as a result 
of harm to private property owners related to sea level rise, increased storm frequency and 
severity, and associated coastal flooding and erosion.  
Consideration of potential takings liability associated with adaptation efforts may reduce 
potential exposure to future takings liability. Municipalities and other governmental 
entities may take a range of actions to increase coastal resiliency, including development of 
plans and policies; engaging in permitting activity, and constructing or maintaining coastal 
infrastructure. 
Planning, policymaking, and permitting 
Municipal planning may give rise to takings claims if plan causes a reduction in property 
values. For example, a coastal resilience or hazard mitigation plan could indicate that a 
property is at a high risk of inundation, which could reduce the fair market value of that 
property. Similarly, zoning regulations prohibiting or tightly restricting development in an 
area previously developable could result in a takings claim, either through the plan or 
policy itself or as a result of permitting decisions based on that plan.23  
Takings cases are fact-intensive and highly dependent on the context and details of 
particular properties and plans. However, courts have previously held that a reduction in 
property value, alone, is insufficient to prevail on a takings claim. As a result, to prevail in 
such cases, a property owner must show that the plan or policy works a total taking of her 
beneficial use of the land or must show other elements sufficient to enable a court to 
determine, based on the Penn Central factors, that a taking has occurred. Local and state 
governments must either plan for payment of compensation when enacting laws and 
regulations that will result in takings or tailor their efforts to avoid causing a taking. 
Infrastructure 
Governmental actions related to coastal infrastructure may have long-term liability 
consequences to the extent that they may result in takings. Takings claims may arise in this 
context if infrastructure causes or contributes to harm, such as by removal of access to 
private property (e.g., through abandonment of roadways) or by creation of infrastructure 
that adversely affects property either by poor design, downstream effects, or other cases 
(e.g., dredging that increases storm surge or groins or other hard stabilization structures 
that cause erosion by stopping lateral movement of sediment along the shoreline). Recent 
cases have indicated that government infrastructure actions may result in permanent or 
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temporary takings of private property.24 Governments seeking to avoid this liability may 
benefit from a forward-looking consideration of the potential consequences of their 
infrastructure decisions over their complete lifespan and maintain their infrastructure to 
ensure that it continues to operate as designed.  
Conclusion 
Emerging challenges such as sea level rise and increased storm frequency and severity 
pose challenges for municipal and state governments throughout Rhode Island. Efforts to 
increase coastal resiliency and proactively adapt to changing conditions may result in a 
proliferation of legal claims seeking compensation for losses of property value and other 
losses based on the takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions.  
The courts will likely be sympathetic to the challenges facing shoreline managers and to the 
need for policies and practices to evolve to meet this new challenge. As the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court explained:  
The power of the state to regulate for the protection of public health, safety, 
and morals, also known as the police power, is not a static concept. As 
advances in scientific knowledge have increased public awareness of certain 
harms, the power of society to guard against these newly perceived dangers 
must adjust accordingly. Activities that have previously been considered 
harmless may come to be recognized as serious threats to the public well-
being. Concomitantly, new technologies may render harmless conduct that 
previously put public health at great risk.25  
While efforts to avoid takings liability may not be completely successful, governments can 
mitigate their exposure to liability related to their adaptation efforts by considering 
potential liability in advance and designing their activities to tread the narrow path 
between causing undue harm to property owners on the one hand and protecting the 
interests of all on the other.  
1 U.S. CONST. Amend. 5 (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); 
R.I. CONST., art. I § 16 (“Private property shall not be taken for public uses, without just compensation.”). 
2 Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1252 (R.I. 1997) (state takings clause “evinces a strong Rhode Island 
policy favoring the preservation and the welfare of the environment”), citing R.I. CONST., art. I § 16 (“The 
powers of the state and of its municipalities to regulate and control the use of land and waters in the 
furtherance of the preservation, regeneration, and restoration of the natural environment, and in furtherance 
of the protection of the rights of the people to enjoy and freely exercise the rights of fishery and the privileges 
of the shore, as those rights and duties are set forth in Section 17, shall be an exercise of the police powers of 
the state, shall be liberally construed, and shall not be deemed to be a public use of private property.”). 
3 Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d at 1252. 
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4 E & J, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of Woonsocket, 405 A.2d 1187, 1189 n.1 (R.I. 1979) (“‘Inverse 
condemnation’ is a term used to describe a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the 
value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal 
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.”). 
5 Neither the state nor any municipality is immune from takings claims, nor is its liability limited by statutory 
liability caps. L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 218-19 (R.I. 1997) 
(Flanders, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“any [] state constitutional damage remedies would 
not be subject to the statutory cap on tort claims against state and municipal entities.”). 
6 Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 139 (R.I. 1983). 
7 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
8 Annicelli, 463 A.2d at 139. 
9 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), cert. granted 531 U.S. 923 (2000), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), on remand 785 A.2d 561 (2001). 
10 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). 
11 Annicelli, 463 A.2d at 139 (“When all beneficial use of property is deprived by governmental restrictions, 
there is no question that an unconstitutional taking can occur even in the absence of a physical entry . . . . 
Whether a taking has occurred depends upon whether ‘the restriction practically or substantially renders the 
land useless for all reasonable purposes.’”). 
12 E & J Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of Woonsocket, 405 A.2d 1187, 1191 (R.I. 1979) (“Depreciation of 
property values alone by the act of an entity vested with the power of eminent domain is not a taking of 
property within the meaning of section 16.”). 
13 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 
1249, 1252 (R.I. 1997). 
14 Penn Central Transp. Co, 438 U.S. at 124. 
15 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“The right to improve property, of course, is subject to 
the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use 
restrictions.”).  
16 See, e.g., Annicelli, 463 A.2d 133. 
17 See, e.g., Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 1997); Palazzolo v. State of R.I., No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 
1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). 
18 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)). 
19 Ark. Game & Fish Com’n v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 511, 519 (2012) (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 
266 (1946)); see also id. at 515 (“Ordinarily, this Court's decisions confirm, if government action would 
qualify as a taking when permanently continued, temporary actions of the same character may also qualify as 
a taking.”). 
20 Id. at 518-19 (holding that repeated temporary releases of flood waters by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
may constitute a taking and reviewing cases holding prior government-related flooding to be takings). 
21 Id. at 522-23 (noting considerations for case-specific factual analysis of temporary takings cases); see also 
St. Bernard Par. Gov't v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 719 (Fed. Cl. 2015). 
22 St. Bernard Par. Gov't, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719 (requiring plaintiffs to establish five factors in reliance on 
Arkansas Game and Fish: “(1) a protectable property interest under state law; (2) the character of the 
property and the owners' “reasonable-investment backed expectations”; (3) foreseeability; (4) causation; and 
(5) substantiality.”). 
23 While in most such cases courts have required appeal from a permit decision, a challenge may, in some 
cases, precede such a final determination as to a particular parcel. Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606 (2001) (finding case ripe for determination without permit decision). 
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24 See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. 687; Banks v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 603 (Fed. Cl. 2008) 
(holding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers liable in takings claim arising from shoreline erosion caused in part 
by construction and maintenance of harbor jetties). 
25 Milardo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council of Rhode Island, 434 A.2d 266, 269 (R.I. 1981) (internal citation 
omitted). 
